Russia Continues With Its Destruction Against Ukraine, As Donald Trump Urges The War should End By June 2026.

February 2026: Russian forces are continuing their cognitive warfare campaign that uses small-scale cross-border attacks in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine to try to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on February 8 that Russian forces seized Sydorivka (northwest of Sumy City on the international border).

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the seizure is part of efforts to establish a “buffer zone” in northern Sumy Oblast and credited elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorised Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with allegedly seizing the settlement. Sydorivka is just east of Komarivka, a previously dormant area of the front where Russian forces launched cross-border attacks in December 2025.

The Russian milblogger further claimed that the Russian military command plans to create more than 20 assault groups from elements of the Russian 02nd Motorised Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) to attack deeper into Sumy Oblast from Bila Bereza (northwest of Sydorivka on the international border) and Komarivka. The milblogger have also reiterated that elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and 30th Motorised Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorised Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) will follow the RVSN troops to consolidate positions. ISW has previously observed reports that the Russian military command is misusing specialist RVSN personnel as assault troops in the Sumy direction.

In late December 2025, Kremlin began a cognitive warfare campaign using cross-border attacks in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts to try to generate informational effects and influence ongoing negotiations to end the war. The Russian seizure of Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City); alleged seizures of Komarivka, Bila Bereza, and Popivka (north of Hrabovske); and advances into Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City) are likely part of this effort. ISW has not observed any evidence to suggest that Russian forces have made significant advances toward any operationally significant objective since the alleged seizures of these small border villages or indicators of Russian preparations for a significant offensive into Ukraine from the north.

Russian forces have not conducted a sustained and intense battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to degrade Ukrainian logistics to defensive positions and to prepare the battlefield for ground assaults along the international border in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, as Russian forces did in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions. Military experts asserts that Kremlin likely aims to portray these limited cross-border attacks as a broad new Russian offensive that reinforces the Kremlin’s narrative that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable in order to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s demands now out of fear of intensified Russian offensive operations in the future.

Russian milbloggers continue to claim, that SpaceX’s recent block of unregistered Starlink terminals in Ukraine is hindering Russian combat operations in Ukraine, while further claiming that on 08th February those very Russian units at various, unspecified sectors of the front are experiencing communication issues after the block and need radio and satellite equipment donations. Another Russian milblogger claimed that the block was “extremely unfortunate”. The milblogger assumed that “wise” commanders long ago understood the dangers of Russian forces’ reliance on Starlink and created alternative communication means, but that the block is still negatively impacting combat operations, as Russian forces so far have no equivalent to fully replace Starlink.

The American President Donald Trump in his recent dialogue with his Russian Counterpart – Vladimir Putin has urged that the aggression on Ukraine needs to be ceded by June, 2026. But apparently, without heeding to such an advice from the United States, Russian forces continue to integrate air-to-air capabilities onto their Shahed-type drones to ensure the drones evade Ukrainian air defenders and to undermine Ukraine’s air defence.

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported on February 08, that a Ukrainian interceptor drone shot down a Russian Shahed-type drone equipped with R-60 air-to-air missiles that were facing backwards. Russian forces previously equipped Shaheds with forward-facing R-60 missiles in order to destroy Ukrainian helicopters and tactical aircraft that hunt Shaheds. The shift from forward- to backward-facing R-60s suggests that the intended purpose of the modified drone may have shifted. Russian forces were likely first using the drones with forward-facing R-60 missiles specifically to search for and then strike Ukrainian aircraft. Russian forces now appear to be using backward-facing missiles in order to defend the drone if it encounters a Ukrainian aircraft, but then allow the drone to threaten Ukrainian aircraft involved in air defence operations and to continue toward its original target.

Parts of Ukraine’s defence industrial base (DIB) have achieved self-sufficiency such that Ukraine can start exports to the West. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 08 that Ukraine is opening its military exports and will open 10 export centres in northern European states and the Baltic states in 2026. Zelensky did not specify which weapons Ukraine will export, but stated that Ukraine will start to jointly produce Ukrainian drones in Germany in mid-February 2025 and that Ukraine and the United Kingdom (UK) have opened joint production lines in the UK. Ukraine began in 2023 to pursue its long-term objective of ensuring the self-sufficiency of its DIB such that Ukraine could be less reliant on foreign military provisions in the future.

Western security and financial aid to Ukraine in the past years helped the Ukrainian DIB in these endeavors, and ISW assessed in early 2024 that Ukraine would require considerable Western military assistance for several years before Ukraine achieved self-sufficiency. Ukrainian exports, as well as joint European-Ukrainian and US-Ukrainian production, are mutually beneficial, as the West can use Ukraine’s experience fighting a 21st-century war with an accelerated offense-defence technological cycle to bolster its defences and own DIBs.

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian missile strikes in January 2026 damaged parts of Russia’s Kapustin Yar launch site. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 08, that previous Ukrainian strikes against the Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast damaged a technical facility that serviced intermediate-range ballistic missiles, an assembly building, and a logistics warehouse. On 05th February, the Ukrainian General Staff has reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against the Kapustin Yar site with Ukrainian-produced long-range weapons, including FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles, in January 2026. Russian forces launched their November 2024 and January 2026 Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strikes against Ukraine from Kapustin Yar.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Studenok, north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and toward Nova Sich and Korchakivka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Loknya and toward Myropillya, and southeast of Sumy City near Pokrovka, Hrabovske, and Vysoke, on February 07th and 08th.

Meanwhile, Russian military police elements conducted raids near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo, Kursk Oblast) to search for deserters from the Russian 22nd Motorised Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorised Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 1427th Motorised Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD), and an unspecified Spetsnaz (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) unit during the past week (presumably February 1 to 8).

Drone operators of the Russian 1431st Motorised Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.

Team Maverick.