What is Strategically Necessary is An Open Innovation in Defence.

As civilian technologies rapidly reshape the global balance of power, open innovation has become not just a strategic option but the only viable path for keeping defence systems relevant, adaptive, and competitive. Sustaining this path, however, requires more than recognition. It demands long-term investment, institutional reform, and strategic resolve. Ultimately, the integration of civilian innovation into national defence is not just a technical upgrade. It is a redefinition of how states build power, adapt to disruption, and secure their future. In this context, open innovation is not a luxury. It is a strategic necessity

Two countries – Israel and The United States offer two distinct approaches, one is institutionalised and formal, the other agile and network-based, both demonstrating that open innovation can be adapted to different political cultures and institutional landscapes.

The United States has developed a highly structured and formalised open innovation system. It includes multiple dedicated agencies such as the Defence Innovation Unit (DIU), the National Security Innovation Network (NSIN), and the Office of Strategic Capital, all of which serve as intermediaries between the Department of Defence and the broader technology landscape. These entities run accelerators, issue challenge-based contracts, and invest in dual-use startups through flexible mechanisms like SBIR grants, OTAs, and venture partnerships. Academic engagement is also deeply institutionalised through Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) and University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), which provide long-term defence research capacity embedded within top-tier universities.

Israel, by contrast, has followed a more decentralised and agile path. While it lacks the bureaucratic scale and institutional layering of the US system, but still it leverages tightly knit networks, personal relationships, and national service ties to create permeability between the defence establishment and the civilian innovation sector. The Ministry of Defence’s Directorate of Defence Research and Development (DDR&D) plays a central role in identifying promising technologies and guiding their adaptation for defence use. Much of this activity is driven through informal channels, such as elite military units that feed talent into the civilian tech ecosystem, and targeted accelerators or co-investment tracks that align private ventures with defence needs.

These two cases illustrate the broader truth that there is no single “correct” model for open innovation in defence. What matters is not the structure itself, but the strategic intent behind it and the willingness to institutionalise relationships with external innovators. Whether through formalised agencies and challenge platforms or through lean, adaptive networks built on shared experience and trust, states must find mechanisms that suit their internal logic while still opening the gates to outside innovation.

While the pathways to open innovation may vary, the conditions for success remain consistent. Regardless of institutional structure, geography, or political culture, defence organisations that seek to integrate civilian innovation must build specific enabling mechanisms. Without them, efforts will remain fragmented, symbolic, or unsustainable.

First and foremost, there must be strategic recognition. Leadership across the defence ecosystem, from ministries and procurement offices to R&D units and operational commands, must acknowledge that civilian innovation is not merely a supplemental asset but a core source of technological relevance. This recognition must be codified into national strategy documents, planning frameworks, and resource allocation priorities.

Second, access channels must be institutionalised. Governments must establish or empower intermediaries that serve as the connective tissue between defence and civilian sectors. These may include dedicated innovation units, joint accelerators, liaison offices within academic institutions, or public-private co-funding schemes. The key is to reduce the friction that often deters startups, researchers, and tech firms from engaging with national security challenges.

Third, funding models must be adapted. Traditional defence procurement is often ill-suited to the iterative, rapid cycles of civilian innovation. Flexible funding mechanisms like seed grants, milestone-based contracts, or matching investment funds can lower barriers to entry and make participation attractive for smaller players. Equally important is ensuring continuity of support from proof-of-concept to full integration.

Fourth, procurement and IP frameworks must evolve. Many promising companies avoid defence markets due to long contracting timelines, unclear intellectual property arrangements, and reputational risks. Addressing these issues through fast-track pathways, modular contracting, or IP-sharing models can dramatically expand the pool of potential partners.

Finally, efforts to bridge the civilian–defence divide must contend with issues of trust. In many cases, cultural tensions between civilian and military communities, differences in language, pace, incentives, and institutional logic those make trust difficult to establish, and in some contexts, perhaps unattainable. Therefore, policy frameworks should be designed to function despite friction: by creating clear rules of engagement, ensuring transparency, and building low-risk entry points that allow cooperation without full cultural convergence.

For much of the 20th century, national defence establishments were the principal engines of technological advancement. In the 21st century, that dynamic has changed. Civilian high-tech sectors driven by global tech giants, pioneering academic institutions, and a vast entrepreneurial ecosystem have become the primary incubators of cutting-edge technologies, from artificial intelligence and quantum computing to advanced autonomous systems.

This presents a profound challenge for national security systems. Technologies critical to future warfare are now being developed outside the gates of the defence establishment, often in environments that had no initial security orientation. The question today is no longer whether defence systems should adopt open innovation strategies, but how they should do so, and to what extent.

At its core, open innovation is the deliberate engagement by an organisation with external sources of knowledge, technology, and ideas to complement and expand its internal capabilities. It is not a management trend or theoretical abstraction but a strategic paradigm that requires institutional, financial, and cultural mechanisms to systematically access, evaluate, and integrate external knowledge and technologies. Civilian sources like startups, universities, and tech firms must be viewed not as peripheral actors but as central players in national defence. This imperative is especially critical for nations engaged in protracted power struggles. Falling behind in tapping into civilian sources of innovation means compromising future security.

Countries like the United States and Israel already engage extensively with open innovation in ways tailored to their institutional landscapes. While their approaches differ, they share a strategic insight: to sustain a technological edge, the defence system must deliberately and intelligently open itself to the civilian innovation ecosystem.

The reason is simple: in today’s fast-moving technological landscape, no single organisation, not even a national defence organisation can keep pace with the scale, speed, and diversity of civilian innovation. Disruptive breakthroughs in AI, cyber, robotics, quantum technologies, and advanced materials are being driven by civilian actors that include academic labs, private companies, and early-stage startups backed by venture capital. Many breakthroughs emerge far outside the traditional defence ecosystem and they often have no initial connection to military needs.

Team Maverick