Washington DC; October 2026: United States Under Secretary Of War, Elbridge Colby has reiterated that Pentagon is “increasing nuclear options available to President Donald Trump for the purposes of deterring or responding effectively to a nuclear contingency”.
Maverick News 30 has analysed the update on Implementation Of The 2026 National Defence Strategy Submitted To The Senate Armed Services Committee On September 22nd, 2026.
The classified version of the 2026 National Defence Strategy lays out in detail how the Department of War will advance President Trump’s common sense, America First, Peace Through Strength agenda. The unclassified version of the 2026 NDS offers a summary of that guidance, including DoW strategic priorities, the logic of our approach, and some of the specific initiatives that DoW will use to achieve the objectives set forth in the NDS.
This statement offers an unclassified update on DoW implementation of the 2026 NDS. All references to the NDS in this document should therefore be understood to refer to the unclassified version, which is fully consistent with, though abridged from, the classified version.
The 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS) directs how the Department of War (DoW) will advance President Trump’s common sense, America First, Peace Through Strength agenda. It was drafted in tight alignment with the President’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). It also drew heavily on input from throughout the Department. As such, the final version of the NDS received near-unanimous concurrence from the Department’s senior most uniformed and civilian leaders. This NDS was also heavily coordinated at the highest levels of the interagency to ensure alignment with the President’s objectives and intent.
Secretary Pete Hegseth wrote in his cover memorandum for the document: “This Strategy reflects President Trump’s historic approach to our nation’s defence. It must be carried out thoroughly, rapidly, and comprehensively. All Department of War components will adhere to the guidance and direction enclosed”.
The 2026 NDS begins by directing the Department to prioritise the missions that matter most for Americans security, freedom, and prosperity, with particular attention to Homeland defence and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. This is vital to ensure that Americans’ concrete interests are guarded against the gravest and most consequential threats facing them. In addition, and crucially, by prioritising these missions, the Department can ensure that the President always has the operational flexibility and agility required to deliver devastating effects against other threats, as DoW has shown in the Middle East.
At the same time, the NDS directs DoW to increase burden-sharing with allies and partners, including by incentivising and then enabling them to do more for their own defence. This is partly a matter of justice: allied freeriding was corrosive to our alliances and never fair to Americans, and President Trump has made clear that it will not be tolerated. Yet increased burden-sharing is also better for allies themselves. Indeed, America’s allies include many of the world’s wealthiest nations. With them fully engaged in the defence of our shared interests, there is no doubt that we can together raise and sustain the combined power required to reinforce and sustain deterrence in each of the world’s key regions, even in case of simultaneous contingencies.
This, in turn, will enable us to solve the simultaneity problem and set structural conditions for lasting peace through strength around the world, as President Trump has directed.
Finally, the NDS recognises the critical role of America’s defence industry in supporting each of the other priorities. It therefore directs DoW to supercharge the US defence industrial base, not only by surging production of certain existing capabilities but also leading and accelerating development and fielding of new, cutting-edge technologies designed to give US war fighters a clear and enduring advantage over all potential opponents.
The remainder of this statement provides updates on each of the efforts described above. They are organised in alignment with the four key lines of effort laid out in the NDS:
·Defend the US Homeland;
·Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation;
·Increase Burden-Sharing with US Allies and Partners;
·Supercharge the US Defence Industrial Base.
It is mention worthy that Elbridge Colby has been advocating for the nuclear architecture since 2011. On April 11, 2011 – Colby in what famous as the guiding principles for the new nuclear guidance have said:
The Obama Administration has ordered the US nuclear weapons bureaucracy to begin studying whether the US nuclear deterrent can be reduced below the caps imposed by the recently-ratified New START Treaty.
Given the President’s commitment to modernising the Triad and reinvigorating the nuclear weapons complex and the Nuclear Posture Review’s pledge that any further reductions would strengthen deterrence, stability, and assurance, the Administration may not end up seeking to meddle with the traditional formula. To that point, 41 Senators advised the Administration to stick with the tried and true in a letter on March 22, 2011. Yet the Administration does face substantial pressure from the disarmament community both here and abroad to make dramatic moves away from the traditional US posture, and indeed some in the Government appear to be quite sympathetic to such a policy.
This would be a mistake. Instead, the upcoming nuclear targeting review should focus on maintaining a supremely reliable and strong strategic deterrent, even while genuinely looking for ways to prune unnecessary requirements. This review should be guided by the following principles essential to the effective deterrent that the President and Senate have pledged to maintain and modernise:
Deter aggression against US vital interests: The fundamental, overriding purpose of US strategic forces is to deter aggression against our vital interests. In this light, US forces should be developed and postured to make clear that the United States possesses the capability and the resolve to respond to significant aggression against its core interests, including the security of those nations covered by US nuclear guarantees, by inflicting punishment against the attacker that would vastly outweigh any of his gains. With such a posture, major aggression against the United States and its vital interests is perforce irrational.
Size and shape forces according to what is needed to deter: US strategic forces should be sized and shaped based on what is needed to deter potential adversaries, not by a pre-determined level set by our own preferences. The potential enemy, in other words, is the one who sets what is needed to deter. But how much is enough?There can be no definitive answer because deterrence is an inherently contextual and variable endeavour. What is enough to deter one man will not necessarily deter another – an Assad is likely more easily deterred than a Hitler. Indeed, what is enough to deter the same man in one situation will not necessarily deter him in another. Threats that might have deterred Hitler’s move into the Rhineland in 1936, for instance, might not have been enough to deter him from the invasion of France in 1940. Moreover, different societies and leaderships differ in their hierarchies of value. (The Leninist Soviet Union’s sense of what was most valued, for example, was not merely a reflection of the preferences of the liberal capitalist United States).Yet all political leaders value something. Determining how much of these valued things need to be held at risk of destruction involves questions of intelligence, capability, morality, and crisis stability, but, in principle, it can only help deterrence for the United States to be able to destroy as much as possible of what is most valued.With such capability, no sane opponent would ever trigger US retaliation. Furthermore, because it is inherently difficult for outsiders to ascertain what it is that opposing leaders most value, it is more prudent for the United States to plan conservatively.Better, in brief, to be safe than sorry. It is important to note, however, that the capability to destroy these things does not mean the United States would be forced to. Because US forces should continue to have the capability to conduct selective and discriminate strikes, the United States would not be compelled to act on these conservative assumptions.
Ability to hold an opponent at risk wherever he goes: The core of deterrence lies in being willing and able to hold at risk of destruction, and, if necessary, to destroy what an adversary most values. If one’s enemies, however, can make themselves immune to retaliation by burrowing underground or otherwise eluding the reach of American retaliatory strikes, then deterrence is seriously compromised.The United States therefore needs the ability to strike at an opponent wherever he goes. Indeed, the capability to attack elusive targets is particularly important for a more deliberate posture, since the absence of such a capability would place enormous pressure on a US President to act on any perceived opportunity before an opponent is able to flee beyond the reach of US weapons. It is important to note that weapons for attacking underground or other elusive targets need not be nuclear, but nuclear weapons should also not be excluded from consideration if they are the only satisfactory option.
Assured devastating second strike capability: The United States should maintain the assured ability to conduct a devastating, effectively annihilating strike against any opponent even after an attempt by that opponent to disarm the United States through a first strike of its own. This requirement puts a premium on the survivability of US strategic forces as well as their ability to penetrate enemy defences and deliver their weapons to target. It also puts heavy emphasis on our command and control systems and procedures to ensure that the National Command Authority can execute a devastating strike under any contingency, even the most stressing. Finally, US forces designated for a second strike should be able to destroy the attacking country as a functioning society.Again, while there is no “right” definition for this standard of destruction, the United States should retain a conservative assessment of what is required. Nations have much ruin in them, as the experience of World War II conclusively demonstrated, and no nation should ever be confused as to the absolute devastation that would follow triggering the full strength of the US deterrent.
Limited and discriminate options: US deterrence, and especially extended deterrence, is significantly strengthened by the supplementary ability to conduct limited and discriminate strategic strikes. This capability gives the National Command Authority the wherewithal to tailor deterrence and, if necessary, attacks to the situation at hand and thereby avoid the choice of all-out war or inaction while maintaining the capability to conduct full, devastating strikes. The capability to conduct discriminate strikes requires flexible and accommodating planning capacities, responsive and adaptable delivery systems, and supremely reliable command and control assets, as well as additional weapons to ensure the retention of the requisite number of weapons for a full, devastating strike.
Secure reserve force: The United States should not be left vulnerable after executing a strike, including a major retaliatory strike in which some US assets will have been destroyed or otherwise attrited. US strategic forces should therefore include a secure component that could be withheld even in a worst-case exchange with our primary rival or rivals. This force need not, naturally, be overlarge, but it must be survivable and under the firm control of the National Command Authority.
Redundancy: The technical requirements for US forces are extremely demanding. Nuclear warheads mounted on ballistic missiles are expected to travel through space, penetrate opposing defences, and land within dozens of yards of their targets. Bombers need to approach their targets and fire their missiles or drop their ordnance in the face of air defences, jamming, and other resistance. More prosaically, highly complex nuclear weapons can decay and cease to function appropriately. Technical failure, vigorous defence, and human error are just some of the reasons systems can fail. In this light, US plans need to build in additional forces to ensure the overall effectiveness of the plan. These requirements can be satisfied at lower numbers, however, if modernised delivery systems and weapons with improved reliability can be introduced into the plan.
Minimise the destabilising aspects of US forces: The United States has a strong interest in minimising the destabilising aspects of US strategic forces, particularly with respect to Russia and China.Because the capabilities and posture of one side’s strategic forces can give the other side reason to fear for the survival and effectiveness of its own strategic capabilities and vice versa, the anxious side may plan and posture to launch an attack quickly or automatically in the event of a crisis in order to ensure retaliation. This benefits no one. US strategic forces, which are the world’s most sophisticated, can generate these kinds of fears. While US forces need to be highly effective and reliable, the United States should look for ways to meet these objectives while minimising the degree to which our forces and posture encourage other countries to adopt “hair-trigger” or otherwise less deliberate postures.
None of this is hypothetical, not for an administration that went to war with Iran this year for the stated reason of keeping Tehran from ever getting a nuclear weapon. In this environment, handing Trump more nuclear options isn't some wonky policy tweak. This is a question of national survival.
That’s not to say that nuclear war is imminent or even likely. But isn’t nuclear policy the kind of thing the public should have some or literally any say in?
Team Maverick.
