Can Iran rebuild its Nuclear Programme?

On 22^nd. June, 2025, the United States had launched a strategic attack named “Operation Midnight Hammer” on Iran’s Nuclear Site. It has raised flags about Iran’s over ambitious Nuclear Plans, while some claimed that the attack has resulted in a disastrous affect on Iran’s Nuclear Sites.

Recent satellite images have helped in assessing a more realistic picture of the extent of the damage from the Israeli and U.S. strikes. It also provides insights into Iran’s initial efforts to rebuild its nuclear program and can help identify potential pathways for developing a covert nuclear weapons program, including establishing a third site to process its existing stockpile of 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The images have demonstrated that the U.S. and Israeli strikes inflicted significant damage on Iran’s nuclear program by destroying key infrastructure and human capital. Israel’s broader campaign against Iran also targeted military leaders, Iranian missiles, and defense industrial base targets. The precision of these operations revealed a deep penetration of intelligence, particularly by Mossad, into Iran’s nuclear program. The strikes did not, however, completely eliminate the nuclear program, with some infrastructure remaining intact, and the status of the HEU stockpile remains unknown.

But whether or not Iran rebuilds its nuclear program is ultimately a political decision and will depend on three sets of factors: decision making in Tehran; diplomacy with the United States; and Israel. It was on 12^th. June, much before the first Israeli strikes, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the international nuclear regulatory watchdog, concluded Iran was in breach of its nonproliferation obligations.

Israel’s “Operation Rising Lion” targeted Iranian nuclear facilities along with scientific experts. While Israel was able to achieve air superiority and impose significant damage on Iran’s nuclear program, it lacked the ordnance to penetrate deep underground facilities, such as those at the Fordow site. To assist with this, the U.S. strikes on June 22 hit three Iranian nuclear facilities, including two uranium enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz and a uranium processing facility at Isfahan. Satellite images reveals the extent of the damage at all three locations.

The Fordow uranium enrichment facility was built underground inside a large mountain. The United States struck Fordow with 12 Massive Ordinance Penetrators (MOPs), leaving six craters. Images from after the strike indicates that the United States “double-tapped” each impact site, placing two MOPs on each crater. Based on previous satellite Images of the construction of Fordow, it appears that the U.S. strikes targeted ventilation shafts that led into the underground facility.

Satellite Images does not reveal significant activity at Fordow to reestablish operations. Dump trucks and bulldozers are present in the images, and new dirt roads are being constructed around the facility. The impact craters from the U.S. strikes are being filled in, likely to prevent further collapse. This activity indicates that there is an ongoing effort to stabilise the site, but there is no dash to resume enrichment.

The underground Natanz enrichment facility was struck by two U.S. MOPs on 22^nd. June. Additionally, previous Israeli strikes targeted above-ground power transformers and generators at the facility and support buildings. The strikes targeted a small number of buildings, indicating that Israel had strong intelligence about critical site infrastructure.

02 Kilometres South of Natanz, however, activity at an underground facility called Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā or “Pickaxe Mountain” is still ongoing. Pickaxe Mountain was not targeted in the strikes and is undergoing considerable construction. There are two tailings’ piles on the eastern and western sides of the facility.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi reportedly asked Iran about activities at Pickaxe Mountain and did not get a response. However, there is considerable speculation that Pickaxe Mountain could house centrifuge parts and assemblies, or even hold Iran’s unaccounted for 400 kg of 60 percent enriched uranium. While open-source evidence cannot confirm what exactly is going on at Pickaxe Mountain, it is clear from satellite Images that Iran has continued construction at an underground facility very close to the Natanz uranium enrichment site.

The Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center contains several buildings for uranium conversion. To enrich uranium in centrifuges, a substance called yellowcake must be turned into a gas, uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Several buildings at Isfahan were involved in the process of converting yellowcake into UF6. The Isfahan nuclear conversion facility was also used to de convert the gaseous UF6 into uranium metal. That uranium metal could be used in a nuclear bomb.

U.S. and Israeli strikes in June hit over two dozen buildings at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. Satellite Images from July 22 shows limited activity at the complex after the strikes. There is extensive damage at the site, and Iran has made some efforts to clear out roads and stabilise some structures. Northeast of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center is an underground facility. This underground facility does not appear to have been struck during Israeli or U.S. attacks in June. However, one of the entrances to the underground facility was sealed by Iran, possibly as a defensive preparation prior to the U.S. strikes. On June 19, IAEA Director General Grossi stated that Iran was building a third uranium enrichment facility “somewhere near Isfahan”. The underground facility northeast of Isfahan may contain Iran’s third enrichment site.

Satellite Images analysis of all three sites shows that they suffered extensive damage and that Iran is not making a considerable effort to rebuild any of the facilities that the United States had strucked on 22^nd. June. If Iran does decide to reconstitute its enrichment or uranium processing facilities, it may choose to move those capabilities to existing or additional underground facilities.

Degradation of the Nuclear Scientific Base –

Beyond the physical destruction of Iran’s nuclear technology centers, Israeli strikes in June inflicted significant damage to the knowledge base and personnel who work on Iran’s nuclear program.

Israeli Ambassador Zarka told reporters that Israeli strikes in June killed at least 14 leading nuclear scientists, including 09 who were targeted in Israel’s initial strikes on June 13. Ambassador Zarka claimed that these scientists had knowledge of chemistry, engineering, and nuclear physics and were involved in dual-use research that has the potential for weaponisation. This degradation of scientific personnel can have a profound impact on a weapon of mass destruction program.

The loss of tacit knowledge, the unwritten, experiential expertise required for complex tasks like centrifuge operation, UF6 conversion, systems integration, or even nuclear weaponisation is difficult to replace but is often underappreciated. It takes years of specialised training and experience to learn how to build and operate complex machinery, like the centrifuges used for uranium enrichment.

Similarly, the process of converting yellowcake into the toxic chemical compound UF6, which is required for enrichment, demands a deep, practical understanding that cannot be acquired from blueprints or manuals alone. Targeting key leadership and scientific personnel to erode the nuclear knowledge base can be as impactful as destroying facilities and equipment and could expand Iran’s weaponisation and production timelines.

Assessing Iran’s Ability to Rebuild –

The Images analysis points to three key findings about the impact of the strikes on Iran’s nuclear program and its ability to rebuild.

First and foremost, the strikes imposed significant damage, particularly to Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, and essentially brought operations to a halt. Iran is stabilising its facilities in Fordow and Isfahan, but there are no significant signs of the resumption of enrichment activity at the main sites.

Second, the strikes did not completely eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, such as Pickaxe Mountain, where activity continues, and the underground facility near Isfahan, which could be the third enrichment site.

And finally, there remain some key “unknowns” about Iran’s nuclear status. On June 24, Vice President JD Vance suggested that Iran likely still has possession of its existing stockpile of 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. The location of the existing stockpile is unknown; it could be stored in an underground facility like the one northeast of Isfahan or Pickaxe Mountain near Natanz. The stockpile could also be scattered across several locations. Regardless of its location, the existing stockpile presents a large proliferation threat.

An additional unknown is the exact location and status of the third enrichment site, as it was reportedly about to go online, and its operational status is unclear. If Iran can establish a centrifuge capacity, then 400 kg of HEU could be turned into enough uranium for 9–10 nuclear weapons, if enriched to 90%. More worrying, Iran could technically turn its 60% enriched uranium into a nuclear device or a small number of nuclear devices without further enrichment, given that 60% enriched uranium can be used to build a nuclear explosive device although the device would be too large to fit on a missile and would be an ineffective nuclear weapon design.

To accomplish this, Iran may need to reestablish some uranium processing capabilities to de convert gaseous enriched UF6 into uranium metal. This technical capability was likely destroyed in the attacks on Isfahan. While scientifically possible, it is unlikely that Iran would build a bomb with its 60% enriched stockpile without further enrichment. The weapon would be cumbersome, inefficient, and would not provide an effective deterrent.

The future prospects of Iranian nuclear proliferation will likely hinge on how quickly Iran can reconstitute uranium enrichment at its third enrichment facility. It remains unclear how large Iran’s existing stockpile of centrifuges and associated equipment is, or where these assets are stored. If Iran can rapidly mobilize this stockpile, it could covertly enrich its existing uranium reserves into a bomb. However, centrifuge manufacturing and assembly, along with the subsequent weaponisation of a nuclear device, are complex tasks requiring a cadre of technically competent nuclear scientists and engineering personnel, who are now in increasingly short supply.

Mitigating a New Nuclear Iran –

Whether or not Iran rebuilds its nuclear program will depend on three key factors. First and foremost is decision making within Tehran. There are signs of a hardline response from Tehran, including a crackdown on dissent, refusal to return to IAEA inspections, and rumours of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But Iran is not in a position of strength at present. Tehran is facing a major drought and the risk of public unrest. And the Twelve-Day War may have jeopardised the long-term stability of Iran’s oil exports. Now may not be the time to make major financial and political investments in a nuclear program that could make Iran a global pariah.

The second factor will be whether the strikes force Iran to the negotiating table and can result in a new nuclear deal. The current diplomatic environment is severely degraded, with no IAEA presence in Iran and a profound lack of trust, making a negotiated solution challenging but essential.

While the U.S. strikes may have been the best of limited options to prevent an immediate crisis, their lasting success hinges entirely on the outcome of renewed diplomatic engagement. The path forward requires a renewed focus on transparency and verification to address the remaining threats and prevent Iran from reconstituting its nuclear program in secret.

The sticking point in previous negotiations with the Trump administration was whether or not Iran could continue to enrich uranium. Under the NPT, Iran has the right to enrich for civilian purposes as long as these are not diverted or converted for a nuclear weapons program. Neither side is likely to budge from this point, despite the damage of the strikes, and the international community might rally behind Iran’s right to enrichment if Tehran can strike the right narrative.

The third factor will be Israeli actions. With or without IAEA inspections, and either inside or outside of the NPT, Iran could take steps to rebuild its facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan; however, Israel has demonstrated a willingness to use force to prevent any progress in an Iranian nuclear program. One lesson learned from the strikes could be the success of military counterproliferation over diplomatic or political efforts. The Israeli and U.S. strikes should be interpreted as a condemnation of the NPT’s failure to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions over the decades.

Seizing the Opportunity –

The Images analysis suggests Iran may still have some capacity to rebuild a nuclear program, though it likely would not be on the same scale as previously unless it receives outside assistance from Russia, China, North Korea, or another partner. This is a window of opportunity for the United States and the wider international community to press Iran to a diplomatic solution. At a minimum, Iran should commit to remaining in the NPT and a return to IAEA inspections. To resolve the enrichment debate, one option would be a phased approach whereby Iran would not have the right to enrich for up to five years, at which point, if it is in full compliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations, it can resume enrichment activities at 3 percent for civilian purposes only.

Achieving this will not only require commitment by Iran, the United States, and the IAEA, but also by the other five parties to the JCPOA (China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom), along with the NPT, to hold Iran accountable and prove its value in a worsening security environment.

Team Maverick