China’s dominance in Maritime Logistics is a threat to the US’ Economic and National Security.

The United States depends on China’s fleet of ships to deliver everything from food and medicines to electronics. Last year, more than $5 trillion worth of goods transhipped through different U.S. ports, which includes $3 trillion in imports. Almost one-third of that commerce arrived on ships built, owned or operated by China. The United States, once the world’s shipbuilding powerhouse, now depends on China’s fleet to deliver everything from food and medicines to electronics. This import reliance has become one of the most dangerous vulnerabilities in America’s supply chain.

In 1975, the U.S. was one of the top 10 producer of ships, with 77 commercial vessels under construction. Today, less than five are on order, as the U.S. ranks plummeted to 19th globally. Much of the problem started in 1982, when the Reagan administration terminated federal shipbuilding subsidy. Stripped of support, U.S. shipyards were forced to compete with heavily subsidised foreign rivals. New orders plummeted and by the early 1990s, U.S. commercial vessel production was all but extinct, taking roughly 75,000 skilled jobs with it.

On the otherside, China has spent the past 25 years methodically, expanding its global maritime dominance, by the virtue of massive government subsidies which is estimated at roughly $91 billion between 2006 and 2013. China now manufactures 55% of the world’s shipping vessels, surging up from 5% in 1999. In fact, China has more than 1,700 large commercial vessels under construction each year.

China has also assumed a commanding share of other maritime and logistics sectors. It manufactures 95% of the world’s shipping containers and 70% of port cranes. Moreover, China’s state-owned firms control or hold stakes in close to 100 major global ports. China’s leverage over global supply chains and maritime logistics threatens America’s economic and national security. This is especially true, considering that roughly 90% of America’s military cargo is transported by sea.

That’s why suspending dockage fees as part of last month’s “trade truce” with China is misguided. The policy had imposed $50 per net ton of cargo capacity on ships owned or operated by Chinese entities for each U.S. port rotation, rising to $140 per ton in 2028. Even non-Chinese carriers using ships built in China faced smaller fees of $18 per ton or $120 per container, whichever was higher. For a typical container ship, that meant several million dollars in annual charges, enough to offset the unfair advantage created by Chinese subsidies without throttling trade. The policy was well designed: shipowners could have those fees remitted if they ordered a U.S.-built vessel within three years.

Instead, the U.S. is halting the first serious effort in four decades to rebuild America’s shipbuilding capacity, and a way to hold China accountable for its industrial predation. It also removes an incentive that was already working: last summer, the share of Chinese-built ships on America’s three main routes had fallen by almost 08 percentage points as carriers reallocated vessels in advance of the looming fees. Drewry analysts projected that within the year, only one in 20 ships calling at U.S. ports would be Chinese-built as a result of the policy.

Further, the global shipping alliances that dominate maritime trade were reallocating ships to avoid fees rather than pass higher charges on to customers. Furthermore, pausing the fees sends the wrong signal. It rewards China’s brinkmanship and undercuts U.S. credibility with Asian allies, including South Korea and Japan, the countries with those U.S. is coordinating with on shipbuilding and maritime resilience.

China has mastered the art of delay diplomacy: when pressure mounts, it promises “dialogue and cooperation”, only to resume its mercantilist playbook once the threat recedes. The same pattern unfolded in steel, solar and semiconductors. Every month of delay allows China’s shipyards to consolidate their dominance while American yards remain idle. The “temporary” suspension could easily become a permanent concession if talks stall or if industry lobbyists, those who benefit from China’s cheap vessels, can push for another extension.

Access to America’s ports, alike access to its markets is a privilege, not an entitlement. Washington should reinstate the dockage fees as soon as possible and stay the course toward maritime self -reliance.

In any conflict with China, America’s most critical vulnerability wouldn’t be its destroyers, stealth bombers, or submarines. It would be the unglamorous network of ships, aircraft, and supply depots that keep them fighting. Logistics serving as the bridge between the national economy and combat forces is the weakest link in the American deterrence system. After decades of neglect, this bridge is crumbling, and Beijing knows it. Deterring China requires the US build up not only front-line combat forces, but also its logistical infrastructure

The US logistics enterprise is optimised for peacetime efficiency, a euphemism for cost-cutting. American maritime logistics system, essential for sustaining a fight across the vast Pacific, is particularly brittle and unprepared for a protracted conflict. During World War II, America commanded over 6,000 merchant ships to supply allied forces. Today, US is left with lesser than 200 US-flagged oceangoing commercial vessels.

The decline is systemic; The Military Sealift Command, the Navy’s logistics backbone, faces such severe personnel shortages that it is decommissioning ships it cannot crew. The Ready Reserve Force, the US surge fleet for emergencies, is a floating museum; the average ship is over 40 years old, with many struggling to meet activation deadlines due to poor maintenance. This hollowed-out force would likely become a top target in the opening hours of a war.

This logistical deficit directly undermines deterrence; While the best public wargames suggest the US would win a war against China today, Washington’s advantage is shrinking. As INDOPACOM commander Admiral Samuel Paparo notes, we are operating on “narrowing margins”.

Chinese leaders are confident of a possible triumph in a long war by simply wearing out US supply lines. For example, Beijing could mobilise its forces and keep them at a high state of readiness, forcing the US into a costly, draining counter-mobilisation that exhausts their logistics before a shot is even fired.

History offers a stark warning; President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1940 decision to move the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbour was meant to deter Japan. But the forward-deployed fleet was not logistically supported for sustained combat. This vulnerability didn’t deter Japan; it invited attack. Today, US risks repeating this mistake on a grander scale, deploying forces without a credible plan to sustain them under fire.

While the challenge is immense, it is not insurmountable. Averting a logistical catastrophe requires urgent, targeted action in three areas.

• Partner with allies to build a resilient, shared logistics network; Japan and South Korea have world-class shipyards and robust merchant marines. They can help expand US sealift and tanker capacity through co-investment and commercial contracts, while sharing some of the cost. The Trump administration is already wisely exploring these options. Additionally, allies like Australia, the Philippines, and Palau can host more forward-positioned and hardened facilities for repair, rearmament, and resupply. US should also pressure key allies to massively expand their own strategic stockpiles of food, fuel, munitions, critical minerals, and essential components. Deterrence in the Pacific is a team sport.

• Refocus domestic investment on US logistics ecosystem; The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), a congressional fund created to bolster the US posture in Asia, has become a grab bag for unrelated priorities. It must be refocused laser-like on logistics. Congress should give US Indo-Pacific Command more direct control over PDI funds to build the hardened, distributed network needed to operate within range of China’s missiles.

• Start revitalising US national maritime enterprise; This is a generational project, which is why allied cooperation is essential for the foreseeable future, with the work must start now, in earnest. Congress must fund the modernisation of the Ready Reserve Force’s aging fleet, increase capacity at the US Merchant Marine Academy to train a new generation of mariners, and reform pay scales to retain essential workers. While Congress is at it, this would be an optimal time to recapitalise the submarine industrial base. The stronger the US deterrent force undersea, the less important surface logistics will become.

The costs of rebuilding the logistics capacity are substantial, but they pale in comparison to the cost of failure. By using the next annual defence budget to invest in resilient regional logistics, Washington can send an unmistakable, bipartisan signal to Beijing that China has no quick and easy pathway to dominate its neighbourhood by force. The essential bridge between economic might and military effectiveness must be restored as a foundational pillar of our national strategy. It is the delivery system for the arsenal of democracy.

Team Maverick